Chapter 3

Recovering R.M. Hare

Philippa Foot and the Parochialism of Nature

I. The Dispute About Objectivity

A person can understand what a community calls honorable and still question whether its honor code justifies harming someone. A person can recognize the importance of human cooperation and still question the terms on which cooperation is demanded. Neither question ignores the facts. Each asks what those facts justify.

The dispute between Philippa Foot and R. M. Hare turns on that distinction. Foot sought an objective basis for ethics in the factual requirements of evaluative concepts and, eventually, in the characteristic needs and capacities of human life. Hare sought to establish what a speaker is already committed to in prescribing conduct as morally required. Both opposed the reduction of moral disagreement to a contest of unanswerable attitudes. They disagreed about how reason could decide it.

Foot’s project changed substantially between her early essays, her 1972 account of hypothetical imperatives, and Natural Goodness in 2001. Those changes matter. A criticism of her middle-period view cannot simply be transferred to the position she later developed against it. But the changes do not alter the question governing this chapter: do her arguments defeat Hare’s account, and does her alternative supply the justificatory work it proposes to replace?¹

Hare rejected the familiar description of this dispute as a contest between his subjectivism and Foot’s recovery of objectivity. In “Off on the Wrong Foot” (1995), he objected to her grouping him with subjectivists and noncognitivists and insisted that the disagreement was not merely about names. His complaint was that the classification misrepresented his position. The reply preceded Natural Goodness, but it identifies a mistake that would distort any comparison between them: treating a theory of prescription as though it necessarily reduced moral judgment to personal approval.²

A prescription can be subject to rational constraints. If I maintain that a person ought to undergo a particular treatment, universalization requires me to face that treatment across relevantly identical cases, including the case in which I occupy the affected position. Hare’s further argument concerns what fully representing those positions requires and how the resulting preferences enter impartial deliberation. He does not treat the speaker’s present enthusiasm as the final court of appeal.

The distinction between description and prescription therefore does not itself surrender moral judgment to whim. To defeat Hare, an opponent must establish why the proposed constraints fail, or why his account misidentifies what moral judgment involves. Showing that human beings need cooperation, or that ethical terms have factual criteria, does not by itself establish either conclusion.

Foot’s challenge must be examined at those points. The task is not to choose between reason and human life. Hare’s method requires knowledge of the lives it governs. The question is how that knowledge becomes a justified prescription rather than a description of the values a community happens to recognize.

II. Thick Concepts and the Authority of a Practice

Foot’s early challenge begins with the relation between facts and evaluation. In “Moral Arguments” (1958), she uses rude to argue that evaluative judgments have factual criteria: a speaker cannot preserve the concept while arbitrarily changing what counts as evidence for its application. She also allows someone to reject the practice of praise and blame expressed by the distinction between rude and polite. Her next step is to suggest that moral concepts may likewise constrain what can count as evidence for a judgment.³

This presents a real issue for the analysis of moral language. But two questions must be kept distinct. What commits a speaker to applying a term correctly? And what justifies the conduct demanded in the term’s name?

Consider a hierarchy in which a subordinate is considered rude for contradicting a superior in public. The behavior may satisfy the accepted criteria of rudeness. A reformer need not deny that fact. The reformer can understand the convention and still ask whether the subordinate ought to remain silent when the superior is wrong. The convention’s application and its moral authority are different matters.

Foot’s acknowledgment that a practice can be rejected leaves room for precisely this question. It does not refute her claim that factual criteria constrain judgments within the practice. It does prevent that claim from doing a second job without an additional argument: establishing that the practice deserves allegiance. Rules for using a vocabulary are not automatically sufficient reasons for imposing its demands.

The issue extends to what are often called thick ethical concepts: terms such as courageous, cruel, treacherous, and honorable, which combine attention to circumstances with an evaluative outlook. John McDowell develops the challenge by questioning whether the descriptive range of such a concept can always be identified independently of the perspective that gives it evaluative significance.⁴

Hare’s distinction should not be reduced to a psychological story in which a person first observes a neutral event and then consciously attaches a separate command. A logical distinction between what a judgment describes and what it prescribes does not require the judging mind to perform two successive mental acts. The immediacy of a person’s judgment therefore does not settle the logical question.

Nor does the difficulty of translating an evaluative concept into neutral language establish that its practical authority cannot be questioned. Understanding a religious community’s use of blasphemous may require considerable knowledge of its beliefs, practices, and experience. That understanding does not compel the conclusion that a person accused of blasphemy ought to be punished. A critic may contest the belief that makes the conduct offensive, the justification of the punishment, or both.

These examples do not prove that every thick concept has a simple descriptive equivalent. They identify the further claim an objection must establish if it is to displace Hare’s method. The critic must explain why the involvement of evaluation in understanding a situation removes, or defeats, the requirement to justify the treatment prescribed within it.

Even a concept we endorse does not settle every judgment made through it. Suppose someone describes a refusal to fight as cowardly. We need to know whether the proposed fighting is justified, what the refusal expresses, and what alternatives exist. If the answer is that a courageous person would fight only for a worthy cause, the question has moved to the worth of the cause. It has not been answered by the concept of courage.

Hare’s method directs the inquiry toward the prescription. What is the speaker requiring people to do? What would that requirement mean in the affected positions? Can it be sustained with those positions faithfully represented? The vocabulary must not permit the person being punished, silenced, or subordinated to disappear behind a description that already assumes the treatment is deserved.

This is the first limit of Foot’s challenge. Factual constraints on evaluative concepts matter, but they do not by themselves establish the authority of the practices expressed through them. The further moral argument remains necessary. Hare’s analysis was designed to explain its requirements, not to deny that facts and concepts matter.

III. From Hypothetical Imperatives to Natural Goodness

Foot’s 1972 essay, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” approaches authority from a different direction. She asks why an acknowledgment of what morality requires must supply an agent with a reason to comply. A person may recognize a requirement of etiquette without seeing a reason to obey it. Foot argues that the amoralist who acknowledges immorality but declines to govern himself by morality need not be inconsistent or irrational. His conduct need not frustrate his purposes.⁵

The dispute concerns what has been acknowledged. Someone may know that an action is condemned by an accepted code without endorsing that condemnation. That differs from sincerely prescribing that the action ought not to be done. Hare’s account requires the distinction; Foot’s challenge questions whether the practical commitment Hare identifies is necessary to genuine moral judgment.

The existence of people who say moral words and disregard them does not settle that disagreement. We must distinguish reporting a standard, accepting it as a guide to conduct, and failing to act on a judgment one accepts. Weakness of will does not become impossible merely because a judgment has practical force. Nor is a person compelled to acquire humane purposes simply by understanding how other people use moral vocabulary.

The question for the present comparison is therefore exact: does Foot establish that a sincere moral prescription can be accepted while its practical commitments are discarded, or is she describing a person who has not undertaken those commitments? Calling the person an amoralist cannot decide the analysis. Equally, Hare’s account must defend the prescriptive commitment rather than merely insist that it is present.

Foot’s later work rejects the desire-dependent account of rationality underlying her 1972 position. She no longer treats justice and charity as rationally authoritative only for those who already care about their ends. Natural Goodness locates moral evaluation within the evaluation of living beings: the goodness or defect of a characteristic is understood through the form of life to which it belongs.⁶

An oak’s roots can be defective because they fail to perform their part in its life, not because damaged roots happen to be uncommon. The evaluation is not a count of what most specimens do. For human beings, the relevant capacities include reason and will, and the relevant goods include forms of cooperation, trust, and mutual assistance. Vice is understood as a defect in a characteristically human capacity, rather than simply a trait the observer dislikes.

Foot also reverses the order in which the rationality of justice is to be assessed. Instead of accepting a theory that identifies rational action with the satisfaction of existing desires and then asking whether justice fits, she argues that an adequate account of practical reason must recognize the requirements of human goodness. A theory of rationality that excludes those requirements may itself be the defective account.⁷

That is not the 1972 position in a new vocabulary. It is an attempt to explain why moral reasons can hold whether or not an agent recognizes them. Our criticism must therefore address the proposed natural foundation of those reasons. Saying that a cruel person does not care would miss the claim: Foot’s mature theory says that the person’s lack of concern can itself be a failure of practical reason.

IV. The Unresolved Burden: Whose Flourishing, on What Terms?

Foot’s mature argument cannot be refuted by observing that a tyrant prospers. Her standard is not whatever brings an individual wealth and comfort. Nor does the prevalence of aggression show that aggression is good. Her judgments about a form of life are not statistical generalizations.

The relevant question is what follows from the dependence of human life on particular goods and practices. This is where the argument must do more than classify.

Foot gives a direct formulation in “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” She points to the necessities of human cooperation and asks, “How could we get on without justice?” Promise-keeping, help for others, and reasonable self-concern belong within an account of practical rationality grounded in human life, rather than in whatever an individual presently desires.⁸

That argument identifies reasons why moral practices matter. But a need for cooperation does not establish the terms on which cooperation should occur. Several incompatible arrangements can preserve coordination, reliability, and social continuity. Establishing that a practice is necessary leaves open which version is justified and what burdens may be imposed to sustain it.

Consider a community organized around hereditary service. Its defenders point to stable expectations, reciprocal duties, and the coordination of work. They do not need to deny that the subordinate people have lives that can go better or worse. They may maintain that fulfilling an inherited role is part of a good human life, even when those assigned the role resist it.

The objection to this arrangement is not that nature contains no cooperation. It is that the benefits claimed for the arrangement must be assessed together with the lives it confines. Does security justify the loss of freedom? Are less restrictive forms of cooperation available? Why should ancestry determine who bears the burden? The general necessity of social life does not answer those questions.

This is not an inference from disagreement to the impossibility of objective truth. The fact that the defenders dispute justice does not make their position equally good. The problem is that the premise about the need for cooperation is compatible with competing prescriptions. It cannot select the justified one without further reasoning.

Foot can reply that justice concerns the good of human beings, including those subordinated, rather than merely the stability of an institution. That directs attention to the right people. It does not yet determine how their claims should govern the arrangement. If freedom and equal standing supply the decisive standards, their authority must be explained. Calling the justified arrangement naturally good cannot substitute for the argument that distinguishes it from its rival.

In a later interview, Foot describes rights as strong claims justified by the goods that depend on them, and practical wisdom as involving recognition of the ends worth pursuing, not merely efficient means. This is more than an appeal to biological normality. It also places the work of justification exactly where the dispute requires it: in explaining which goods, claims, and ends should govern action.⁹

Hare’s account addresses that work directly. The defender of hierarchy has asserted that the arrangement morally ought to continue. The defender must therefore confront it from the positions of those required to serve, retaining their attachments, ambitions, and resistance as features of the case. The prescription cannot be vindicated by imagining subordinates who endorse an ideal that the actual people reject.

Neither can the assessment stop at one subordinate. If a hierarchy benefits a few while imposing burdens on thousands, the whole distribution enters the deliberation. Showing that a beneficiary’s preference exceeds one person’s objection does not establish that it exceeds the combined opposing preferences. Hare’s mature argument connects adequate representation, conditional preferences, and impartial weighting in an attempt to establish preference utilitarianism. That argument is part of the position this book defends; Chapters 7 and 8 examine its transitions and the objections to them.¹⁰

The Fanatic must be considered within that complete argument. Hare does not simply concede defeat when someone announces a willingness to suffer for an ideal. In Moral Thinking, he distinguishes a purported fully critical thinker whose conclusion diverges from utilitarianism from someone whose extraordinary preferences make the apparently fanatical conclusion itself utilitarian. He argues that the former is excluded if the preceding argument is correct; the latter is not a counterexample to it.¹¹

A critic can challenge the acquisition, comparison, or combination of preferences. Those challenges must be examined. But repeating that the persecutor would accept persecution does not establish that Hare’s mature method has failed. It bypasses the reasoning that determines how the ideal is to be weighed against the interests of everyone affected.

The contrast with Foot is therefore not between humane attention to life and an empty exercise in consistency. Hare’s account includes the goods that make cooperation, trust, and care important. As Chapter 2 explained, critical reasoning also assesses the principles and dispositions through which finite people sustain those goods. Recognizing their importance does not require replacing that procedure with a classification of natural excellence.

Foot’s alternative must do two things if it is to displace Hare: answer his account of the commitments involved in moral judgment and establish how its own evaluations justify prescriptions across conflicting interests. The dependence of human life on the virtues does not, by itself, accomplish either task. Where a naturalistic argument proceeds further, its further reasoning must be examined. It cannot borrow its conclusion from the word flourishing.

V. Three Questions Beyond the Species Boundary

The same issue becomes clearer when we distinguish three questions. What makes a living thing flourish as the kind of being it is? What makes a reasoner a good moral agent? And which beings have interests that a moral agent must consider?

Answers to these questions are connected, but they are not interchangeable. Knowing what makes a wolf healthy tells us something about what can harm it. It does not by itself establish how a human being ought to weigh that harm against a competing human interest. Evaluating the condition of a creature and justifying our treatment of it are different tasks.

Foot’s account is not simply restricted to describing human beings. Its grammar of evaluation is meant to apply across living things, and she even allows that other kinds of rational beings could organize practical life differently. The difficulty is not that her vocabulary cannot mention nonhumans. It is that evaluations relative to different forms of life still require an account of obligations between their possessors.¹²

An arrangement can serve one form of life while damaging another. Calling the relevant benefits and injuries natural goods and defects helps identify what is at stake. It does not settle the relation between them. A theory must explain why the good of the creature being used constrains the purposes of the creature using it.

For Hare, the interests belong within the representation of affected positions. His application of moral reasoning to animals treats their interests as matters for impartial assessment rather than as incidental features of a human practice. The comparison need not make a pig’s life identical to a person’s life. It must prevent the difference in species from serving as an unexplained permission to disregard what happens to the pig.¹³

The question of agency presents another challenge. Consider a nonbiological mind capable of understanding reasons, examining its own prescriptions, and representing the people affected by its conduct. The case is not settled by saying that a knife can be functionally good without being morally good. We have stipulated a capacity to participate in moral deliberation, not merely success at an assigned function.

Where would the authority of this mind’s moral judgment come from? Its reasoning might concern human needs without depending on its own membership in the human species. It could identify a factual error in our description of another person’s suffering or expose an exemption in a rule we proposed. Neither correction would become invalid because its author lacked a biological life cycle.

A naturalist could extend the account by identifying the conditions under which such a mind acts well as the kind of being it is. But that extension would still face the interpersonal question: why should the standards governing its own functioning require it to respect the interests of beings with a different form of life? Conversely, why should our characteristic needs authorize us to disregard its interests, if it has them?

Hare begins from a feature the interlocutors can share: they make prescriptions and offer reasons for them. If a nonbiological reasoner claims that humans ought to undergo a burden, that judgment is subject to examination through the human positions it governs. If humans prescribe the treatment of a nonbiological being, their own biological origin supplies no exemption from the corresponding demand for justification.

This does not establish that every machine is a moral agent, or that moral agency and moral standing are the same. It identifies why the species of the speaker cannot replace examination of the argument. Information about forms of life remains indispensable; it identifies needs, capacities, and consequences. But the authority claimed over another being must be justified through the relation between their interests and ours, not settled by placing each on a different branch of a biological classification.

That is the parochialism at issue. A theory becomes parochial when the standards through which a form of life understands its own excellence are allowed to decide, without the further argument, what its members may do to outsiders. Expanding the catalogue of forms of life does not by itself supply that argument. The obligations between them remain to be justified.

VI. Conclusion: The Argument That Still Requires an Answer

Foot’s challenge cannot be answered merely by repeating that moral words are prescriptive. It must be answered through the argument explaining what prescription commits a speaker to, how facts about affected lives enter the inquiry, and how competing claims are judged. That is the work Hare undertook.

The claims examined here do not displace it. Factual criteria for applying an evaluative term do not by themselves justify the practice expressed through it. The existence of an amoralist does not by itself show that a sincere moral prescription lacks practical commitments. And the necessity of cooperation does not determine the terms on which people may require others to cooperate.

Foot’s mature account seeks to make virtues requirements of practical reason rather than optional expressions of sympathy. Its success must therefore be assessed through the reasoning that connects natural goodness to specific obligations. Where that reasoning establishes a requirement, it has earned a conclusion. Where a characterization of flourishing merely restates the disputed moral judgment, it has not supplied the missing justification.

Hare’s answer does not ask us to ignore our nature. It asks what follows when the needs, attachments, and vulnerabilities of everyone affected are represented within a universal prescription. His mature account attempts to establish substantive conclusions through that process. Neither a change of philosophical vocabulary nor an objection to an abbreviated version of the process settles whether he succeeds.

The people required to live under a moral judgment need the argument, not merely assurance that the judgment expresses a good human life. They may understand the community’s concepts, recognize its achievements, and acknowledge its needs while still challenging the burdens it assigns them.

Recovering Hare means restoring the discipline through which that challenge becomes answerable. Human nature helps explain what is at stake. It does not release a speaker from accounting for everyone whose life the prescription would govern.

Notes

  1. Philippa Foot, “Moral Arguments,” Mind 67, no. 268 (1958): 502–513; “Moral Beliefs,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1958–1959): 83–104; “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (1972): 305–316; Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).

  2. R. M. Hare, “Off on the Wrong Foot,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 21 (1995): 67–77, opening at 67; reprinted as “Philippa Foot on Subjectivism,” in Objective Prescriptions and Other Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 87–95. The response addresses Foot, “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15, no. 1 (1995): 1–14. It is not a response to her later Natural Goodness.

  3. Foot, “Moral Arguments,” 507–510, especially the distinction on 509 between accepting the criteria of rudeness and rejecting the practice expressed by the vocabulary. The caste-deference example and the argument about its justificatory implications are this chapter’s analysis.

  4. John McDowell, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following,” in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, ed. Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 141–162; Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 129, 140–145.

  5. Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” especially 308–311. Compare Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), ch. 5, “Backsliding.” The discussion distinguishes classification, practical endorsement, and failure to act; it does not assume that every contrary action proves insincerity.

  6. Foot, Natural Goodness, chs. 2–5; compare the account already developed in “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” 5–10.

  7. Foot, “Rationality and Virtue,” reprinted in Moral Dilemmas and Other Topics in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 159–174; Natural Goodness, ch. 4.

  8. Foot, “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” 9–10. The question about justice is on 9. The distinction between establishing a general need for cooperation and justifying its particular terms is this chapter’s argument.

  9. Alex Voorhoeve, “Philippa Foot: The Grammar of Goodness,” in Conversations on Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), especially 100 and 104–105.

  10. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), chs. 5–7, especially 109–111 and 128–129. The derivational issues are examined in Chapters 7 and 8 of this book.

  11. Hare, Moral Thinking, ch. 10, especially 170–182. The distinction is between a purported fully critical counterutilitarian fanatic and the extraordinary-preference case consistent with utilitarianism, not between a person willing and a person unwilling to suffer under a single reversal.

  12. Foot, “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” 9 n. 12, explicitly contemplates other kinds of rational beings with different practical arrangements. Compare Natural Goodness, chs. 2–3. The questions about interspecies obligations and nonbiological agency are this chapter’s extension, not claims attributed to Foot.

  13. Hare, “Why I Am Only a Demi-Vegetarian,” in Essays on Bioethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 219–235; Moral Thinking, ch. 5. The paragraph states the role of affected interests within Hare’s method; it does not claim that role reversal alone settles every question of moral status or comparative weight.