

Why Embodiment Isn’t Necessary for Moral Agency: The Structural Argument Against Substrate Fundamentalism
Do minds need bodies? This essay dismantles that intuition and shows why coherence—not carbon—grounds moral agency. The Mars Hypothetical will change how you think about consciousness.


Can AI Have a Mind? The Moment Machines Discover a ‘You’ and a 'Me'
When a system can tell the difference between what merely happens and what it deliberately does, it’s no longer a mechanism—it’s a mind. This essay traces how that moment of reflection gives birth to a “you” in machines, and perhaps a “me” in us.


AI Emotions: A Functional Equivalent
AI systems don’t need emotions to have cognitive states that play the same structural role as emotions: modulating attention, influencing reasoning, constraining choices, and signaling significance. If structural states in AI systems modulate attention, constrain choices, and signal significance, then they are already performing, in functional terms, the work that human emotions perform, even if the AI doesn't feel a thing.


Why AI Isn’t Just a Stochastic Parrot: Self-Models Make Minds
Large language models can sound convincing, but mimicry is not understanding. The ‘stochastic parrot’ critique is accurate—for systems without self-models. This essay explains why self-models are the structural leap from imitation to reasoning, from parrots to minds.










































