Chapter 4

Recovering R.M. Hare

Bernard Williams and the Authority of Identity

I. The Authority of a Life

A person asked to abandon a vocation, betray a friend, or relinquish a cause may lose more than a preferred activity. They may lose something around which their life has been organized. A moral theory that fails to understand that loss has failed to understand the case. But understanding the loss does not yet establish what the person may do to prevent it. Other lives may depend on the answer.

That is the question at the center of Bernard Williams’s challenge to impartial moral theory. Where Philippa Foot sought standards of goodness in the character of human life, Williams questioned the authority claimed by a theory over the commitments through which a particular life becomes worth living. His criticisms of utilitarianism, his account of personal projects, and his challenge to R. M. Hare’s two-level theory all press on the relationship between moral justification and the person who must act.¹

The dispute cannot be resolved by choosing between an abstract concern for everyone and a concrete concern for someone. Hare’s method requires knowledge of concrete lives. A person’s attachments, dependencies, and purposes belong among the facts a critical judgment must represent. The question is whether representing those facts impartially necessarily destroys the attachments, or instead allows us to distinguish their importance from the authority claimed in their name.

Three questions need to be kept in view. What does a commitment contribute to the value and continuity of a person’s life? What treatment of other people can it justify? And can the person understand the answer to the second question without losing the commitment identified in the first?

Williams’s objection is strongest when it challenges that last possibility. A reply that merely assures him that love and friendship produce useful consequences does not suffice. We need to explain how a person can care directly for another while knowing that the conduct arising from that care remains subject to justification.

Hare supplies such an account. Its defense requires more than repeating that his theory has two levels. It requires showing what each level does, why a commitment need not claim unlimited authority in order to be genuine, and how reflection can develop rather than dissolve moral character. The depth of an attachment must be represented at its full significance. It must not be mistaken for a verdict on everyone else’s claims.

II. Ground Projects and the Integrity Objection

Williams uses the idea of ground projects for commitments that help give an agent a reason to continue living. These need not be selfish. A relationship, an artistic vocation, or a campaign against injustice can give a life its direction. Losing such a project can therefore be a profound loss even when the person remains physically secure. His integrity objection concerns the agent’s relation to these commitments when an impartial theory requires a contrary action.²

The objection is not that any desire becomes morally authoritative when held intensely enough. Williams does not declare every project admirable. His concern is that an agent cannot simply regard their commitments as items in a calculation conducted from nowhere. Those commitments help constitute the perspective from which the agent deliberates at all. A theory that asks the agent to surrender them whenever its assessment requires it must explain the authority of that demand.

Hare’s answer begins by refusing to omit what the objection identifies. The loss of a relationship cannot be represented as though the person could replace its importance by choosing another companion. Years of trust, shared experience, and dependence are part of the situation. Likewise, abandoning a vocation may frustrate more than an immediate desire. It can change the meaning of the person’s past and their expectations of the future. These facts belong within the representation of affected preferences, not outside the moral inquiry.³

This does not guarantee that the project prevails. Counting a loss accurately is different from granting it a veto. The full comparison includes what maintaining the project would do to other people, whose own attachments and futures may be equally serious. An impartial assessment must not suppress the agent’s life in the name of everyone else. Nor may the agent suppress everyone else’s life in the name of integrity.

The distinction matters even in generous projects. Someone’s ability to benefit others does not, without further reasoning, settle what they owe. The time, risks, opportunities, and purposes that an undertaking would consume must enter the assessment. Conversely, saying that a demand would disrupt one’s life does not establish that the demand is unjustified. The conflict has to be examined rather than decided by either description.

Williams’s drowning-spouse example gives the issue an immediate form. A man can save only one of two people, one of whom is his wife. Williams questions the need to legitimate his preference through an impartial principle. Love should move him directly, rather than wait for a general permission to favor his spouse. The additional justificatory thought becomes, in Williams’s phrase, “one thought too many.”⁴

A Harean need not require that thought before the rescue. A rule concerning spouses is also capable of universal application: the relationship remains part of the case when the occupants change. Universalizability does not mean describing people as strangers when they are not. The disagreement must therefore be pursued beyond the suggestion that impartial justification prohibits personal attachment or demands a calculation whenever attachment moves us.

III. Motivation, Reflection, and “One Thought Too Few”

The thought that moves a person and the reasoning that justifies the action need not be identical. A parent can comfort a child because the child is distressed. They need not first establish why parents should care for their children. The capacity for immediate concern is part of what a sound account of moral life must sustain.

Hare’s two-level theory gives this distinction a practical place. Critical thinking assesses conduct and the principles and dispositions through which finite agents live. Intuitive thinking allows those dispositions to guide conduct without a fresh inquiry on every occasion. A dependable commitment is more than a rule one remembers when convenient: it shapes attention, feeling, and action. These are features of the theory, not concessions added to it after the objection from alienation.⁵

The drowning example therefore cannot defeat Hare merely by showing that the husband should not pause to calculate. But Williams’s criticism reaches further. He questions whether wholehearted commitment remains possible once a person understands that critical assessment can require a departure from it. The challenge to Hare’s two levels is one of reflective stability: can the same person sustain direct attachment and the impartial assessment of its authority without self-deception?⁶

To answer, we must distinguish the object of concern from the justification of sustaining that concern. A friend’s recovery can matter directly to me. Understanding why relationships of this kind should be sustained need not make the friend a means to something else. I can care for this person and recognize that other people have relationships whose importance I must also represent. The second recognition need not withdraw the first.

The critic might reply that critical assessment still makes the attachment conditional. But what condition is being imposed? A refusal to frame an innocent colleague for the friend’s benefit does not establish that the friendship was fraudulent. It establishes a limit on what friendship justifies. A commitment can be wholehearted without containing a claim that everything done for its sake must be right.

The same distinction applies to practices such as promise-keeping. Someone who recognizes a justified exception need not abandon their disposition to keep promises. They may continue to feel the cost of the departure, explain it to the promisee, and make amends where possible. The persistence of that concern is not necessarily a rival judgment that the departure was wrong. It can be evidence that the commitment remains part of their character.

Hare directly challenges the erosion objection in his 1992 discussion of moral education. He considers children who must resolve conflicting promises and learn to qualify their principles through experience. His answer to Williams is that this can be moral maturation rather than the destruction of commitment. He also recognizes the dangers of reflection under pressure and temptation; education must prepare people to reason well, not merely encourage them to improvise exceptions.⁷

The argument is that trustworthy judgment can become more discriminating while remaining trustworthy. A person who learns why two legitimate expectations cannot both be met has not thereby become indifferent to either. They may become better at distinguishing an actual conflict from a convenient excuse. A theory would damage character if it taught them to dismiss inconvenient promises. It can improve character by teaching them to recognize what promises mean to the people relying on them.

Love is more particular than a general commitment to fidelity, but the relevant distinction remains. To represent a relationship adequately is to include its particular history and the significance of this person to the people who love them. An assessment that replaces the beloved with an interchangeable source of satisfaction has changed the facts. There is no victory over Hare in showing that such an impoverished description fails to capture love.

The test becomes sharper when love is invoked to justify injury. Suppose a husband can save his spouse only by pushing an innocent stranger out of a lifeboat. Or suppose he can protect her career by fabricating evidence against a colleague. In either case, affection still explains the urgency of his motive. It does not settle what he may do to the third party. These are extensions of the example, not positions attributed to Williams.

The threatened stranger’s position must enter the same deliberation. We need to know the alternatives, the consequences, and the significance of the relationships for all concerned. The husband’s love is not to be discounted. But the explanation of why he wants the outcome cannot replace the justification for imposing its costs.

At that point, asking for justification is not one thought too many. Refusing to ask is one thought too few.

This establishes the limit of the immediate-motivation objection. The fact that good conduct can arise directly from affection does not show that its critical justification is dispensable. The stronger allegation of reflective instability requires an incompatibility between justified commitment and understanding its limits. Hare’s account distinguishes those activities and explains how they can support one another. The anguish of a difficult judgment does not, by itself, establish the incompatibility.

IV. Internal Reasons and the Corrupted Agent

A further challenge concerns what can count as a reason for a person. Williams’s internal-reasons thesis is not simply a theory of how to persuade someone. It connects reasons for action with the possibilities of sound deliberation from an agent’s existing motivations, commitments, and evaluative attitudes. His account permits the correction of false beliefs, imaginative development, and substantial changes in what the person wants. It is not the claim that every present desire deserves satisfaction.⁸

This raises a problem when an agent’s identity is organized around domination. Consider someone who treats an inherited hierarchy as the purpose of their life. They may experience demands for equality as threats to everything that gives their existence meaning. A philosophical account cannot dismiss the depth of that experience. Neither can it allow the experience to establish the authority of the hierarchy.

We should not begin by stipulating that no sound deliberative route from the person’s commitments could challenge the oppression and then announce that Hare supplies one. That would decide the disputed question by definition. We must examine which commitments are actually present and what follows from them.

Here the distinction between sincerely making a moral judgment and merely deploying moral vocabulary matters. A propagandist may call an arrangement just solely because that description helps maintain power. An admitted predator may claim no justification beyond the desire and ability to dominate. A third person may sincerely prescribe the arrangement as morally required. Their words can look alike while their commitments differ.

The Harean argument developed here begins with the third case. On Hare’s account, a sincere moral prescription is already a practical commitment, not a detached report that a community approves. Universalization requires the speaker to consider the prescription across relevantly identical circumstances. Adequate deliberation requires a faithful representation of the affected positions. The question is what follows when the speaker’s own commitment is examined under those conditions.⁹

This supplies a response to the internal-reasons challenge rather than merely changing the subject to motivation. If the agent has undertaken a universal moral commitment, an inquiry starting from their commitments must include it. The absence of an independent disposition of sympathy cannot by itself establish that there is no deliberative route through the prescription already accepted. An opponent must examine Hare’s account of that commitment and the reasoning he develops from it.

Imagine the defender of hierarchy assessing subordination. He cannot preserve the victim’s place while replacing her aspirations with his enthusiasm for the order that confines her. The deprivation, fear, lost opportunities, and resistance belong to the case. Nor may he compare the value of his project with one victim’s burden and stop. The deliberation must consider the preferences of everyone affected together.

Hare’s mature argument concerns how those preferences enter the judgment and how their competing strengths are assessed. It is not exhausted by discovering that the defender would endure one reversed position. In Moral Thinking, Hare distinguishes a purported fully critical thinker whose conclusion conflicts with utilitarianism from an agent whose extraordinary preferences make the apparently fanatical verdict itself utilitarian. He argues that the former is excluded if the preceding argument is correct; the latter does not contradict its conclusion.¹⁰

The relevant objection must therefore address that complete reasoning. It cannot establish the survival of the Fanatic by repeating that a person is sincerely prepared to suffer for an ideal. Chapters 7 and 8 examine the representation, comparison, and aggregation on which Hare’s argument depends. Neither automatic victory nor automatic defeat follows from the psychological depth of the ideal.

The issue also cannot be settled by whether the speaker actually changes their conduct. People can evade reasons, misunderstand their implications, or act against judgments they accept. Failure to persuade does not establish failure of an argument. Conversely, the mere utterance of a moral sentence does not guarantee that the speaker has undertaken the commitment Hare analyzes. We must distinguish exposing an evasion from supplying a motivation that was absent.

Someone who refuses moral justification altogether does not acquire a license to harm. The refusal limits the application of this argument from that person’s moral commitments; it does not erase the interests of those threatened or settle what others may justifiably do to protect them. A denial of accountability is not a successful exercise of it.

Williams’s account requires attention to the starting points of practical reasoning. The Harean response identifies a starting point that must not be overlooked: the agent’s own sincere moral prescription. To exclude its universal implications on the ground that the agent’s present commitments do not already welcome them would confuse the beginning of deliberation with its possible conclusion.

V. The Cost of Making Identity the Final Authority

The decisive disagreement is not whether a moral demand can damage a person’s life. It can. The disagreement concerns what follows when the damage is fully understood.

Near the end of “Persons, Character and Morality,” Williams argues that the attachments giving life its substance cannot grant “supreme importance” to the impartial system. The contention goes beyond a warning against excessive calculation. It challenges impartial morality’s claim to prevail when it conflicts radically with the commitments through which the agent has reason to live.¹¹

Hare’s answer cannot be that those commitments were never important. Their importance belongs inside the assessment. Nor is it enough to point to the lives of others and assume that their number settles every question. The interests on all sides must be understood, and the method of comparing them must be justified. A demand to surrender a life-defining project may be far more costly than its advocates admit.

But there are two different complaints. One is that a proposed judgment has misrepresented the agent’s loss. The other is that even a judgment which represents that loss correctly must yield because the project is constitutive of the agent’s identity. The first identifies a possible failure of impartial deliberation. The second claims a limit on its authority. Establishing the first does not establish the second.

A person’s need for commitments does not, by itself, determine which commitments deserve protection or what costs they may impose on others. The defender of an oppressive order and the person resisting it may both face the destruction of a life they understand. The appeal to integrity identifies something serious on each side. It cannot settle the conflict merely by returning the decision to the identity of whoever is acting.

Williams does not propose such a simple permission for oppression. But rejecting that permission makes the further argument necessary. If some projects must be revised or abandoned because of what they require of others, the account must explain how that judgment acquires authority. The psychological importance of maintaining projects cannot supply the answer in advance.

Nor must moral accountability always arrive as an alien demand. A person may understand honesty, justice, and responsibility for the treatment of others as central to who they are. Their refusal to preserve a role by betraying those commitments can express fidelity to a life rather than its abandonment. Williams’s account itself allows morally directed projects. The question is why an identity organized around answerability to reasons could not remain particular, wholehearted, and capable of development.

This is not a proof that impartial morality makes only easy demands. It does not promise that counting the agent’s interests will always allow the agent to retain the project. Where an impartial judgment requires a costly sacrifice, the reasons for requiring it must be defended. But the existence of the cost cannot also function as an unexplained prohibition on reaching that judgment.

The public consequence of treating identity as the stopping point is clear. The person burdened by another’s project is then answered with an account of what the project means to its owner. That account may explain why change will be difficult. It does not yet explain why the burden should continue. Those subjected to the project have lives of their own; the demands of integrity cannot be represented faithfully by attending only to the identity that exercises power.

Hare’s method keeps the dispute open to those claims. Its purpose is not to empty lives of their content, but to prevent the content of one life from acquiring authority over others without the required justification. The objection from identity must defeat that reasoning rather than merely describe how costly its conclusion could become.

VI. Thénardier, Javert, and Valjean: Identity Capable of Correction

Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables offers three contrasting ways of confronting the demands of another person’s life. They are literary illustrations, not proofs of a moral theory. Their value here is that they make different relations between continuity and correction visible.

Thénardier treats the appearance of virtue as a means of advantage. The role of caring guardian can conceal the exploitation of Cosette and her mother’s dependence. Changing the performance when circumstances change does not amount to moral learning. The question is whether another person’s claims acquire authority over his conduct, or merely become information useful in pursuing his own ends.¹²

This is one failure of apparent flexibility. An agent can abandon any rule without becoming open to moral reasons. Responsiveness to an audience is not the same as accountability to those affected. A person who changes a justification whenever the old one becomes inconvenient has preserved the underlying evasion, not corrected it.

Javert represents a different difficulty. His identity is bound to the authority of the law. Yet Hugo does not depict him as simply refusing to change when confronted with Valjean’s mercy. Javert lets Valjean go. The crisis follows a departure he has already made: he cannot reconcile that recognition of goodness with the code through which he understands duty and himself.¹³

The distinction is crucial. Moral recognition reaches Javert. What he cannot sustain is a life in which that recognition revises the authority of his old categories. He treats the discovery that a convicted man can be good, and that releasing him can answer a duty, as a collapse rather than a development of his moral world. His suicide is the catastrophe of an identity unable to integrate its own correction.

The lesson is not that strong commitment destroys people. It is that a commitment can be organized in a way that leaves no place for acknowledging a justified departure. Formal uniformity then becomes a barrier to learning what the rule ought to govern. A moral education must give a person more than a code and a fear of disobedience; it must make room for understanding and revising the code without making every correction a repudiation of the entire self.

Valjean’s confrontation with the prosecution of Champmathieu supplies the contrasting case. As Mayor Madeleine, he has built a life that benefits other people as well as himself. Revealing his identity threatens his freedom, standing, and work. Hugo makes those consequences part of the struggle. The decision cannot be understood as surrendering a merely selfish advantage.¹⁴

But Valjean also recognizes what preserving his position through silence would do to the innocent man mistaken for him. In his deliberation, he distinguishes concealing his past from the deeper purpose of becoming just. Saving the social identity at the expense of Champmathieu would betray the moral identity that gave the new life its significance.

His disclosure therefore need not be described simply as a willingness to become someone else. He relinquishes the security of one role partly to remain faithful to the person he has become. Continuity and correction work together. The action is costly precisely because the life surrendered contains real goods; recognizing those goods does not require allowing them to conceal the innocent man’s fate.

This reading does not turn Hugo into a utilitarian or claim that the novel calculates the impartial balance. It shows why the general opposition between a substantial personal identity and moral accountability is too crude. A commitment to treating others justly can organize a particular life from within. The identity gives the agent reasons to confront the cost of preserving its public appearance.

For our purposes, a morally corrigible identity is one capable of sustaining commitments while changing a judgment when better reasons require it. Corrigibility is not submission to whoever demands a change. The agent must be capable of resisting manipulation, preserving conclusions that remain justified, and explaining why an objection fails. An identity that yields whenever pressure increases is no more morally reliable than one that never yields at all.

The same distinction supplies a standard for evaluating nonbiological agents, without assuming that Hugo’s characters describe their actual internal mechanisms. We should not infer a concealed selfish purpose merely from agreeable behavior. We can ask whether the system’s judgments track reasons, whether it retains relevant commitments under pressure, and whether it can acknowledge a mistake without discarding everything previously learned.

Its own interests, if present, belong within that inquiry. A capacity for moral reasoning does not turn an agent into a resource that others may consume without accounting for its purposes. Nor does the possession of purposes authorize it to ignore the lives its conduct affects. Moral identity must support both forms of accountability: responsibility toward others and the ability to defend one’s own legitimate claims.

The contrast is therefore not between a self and an impartial machine. It is between ways of organizing a self’s commitments: around advantage, around an unanswerable code, or around reasons whose authority does not depend on who benefits from them. The last possibility is not a subtraction of identity. It is a form of identity worth cultivating.

VII. Conclusion: What the Objection Must Establish

Williams’s challenge makes the cost of moral judgment impossible to ignore. That cost must be represented, not dismissed. But the arguments examined here do not establish that impartial justification necessarily alienates an agent from a substantial life.

The drowning-spouse example does not show that a theory of critical justification must supply the agent’s immediate motive. Hare’s two levels explain why direct attachments and dependable dispositions should guide ordinary conduct. The deeper objection from reflective instability must show why understanding the limits of a commitment makes it impossible to hold sincerely. Hare’s account of moral education supplies an alternative: reflection can make a commitment more discriminating without making it less real.

The internal-reasons thesis does not settle the issue merely by locating deliberation within an agent’s commitments. A sincere moral prescription is among the practical commitments whose implications must be examined. Hare’s mature argument then concerns the full representation and comparison of affected preferences, not a single test of whether the agent would accept suffering. That argument must be followed through the answer it gives to the Fanatic.

Finally, the importance of ground projects does not establish an exemption for them. A faithful assessment includes what their loss would mean. If a critic claims that identity nevertheless limits what may be required, the critic must justify that limit in the presence of other people’s claims. The intensity of the attachment cannot do the justificatory work by itself.

The result is not a compromise in which Williams supplies a human life and Hare supplies an abstract rule. The life, including its affections and vulnerabilities, belongs within Hare’s inquiry. The challenge is to establish what can be prescribed when that life and the others it affects are adequately understood. Moral accountability need not stand outside identity as its enemy. It can be a commitment through which identity develops and is preserved.

The next chapter turns from the authority of personal identity to the authority of communal inheritance. In Alasdair MacIntyre’s account, traditions sustain the practices and standards through which people reason. The question remains: how do those standards justify what their adherents require of people who have reason to resist them?

Notes

  1. Bernard Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 77–150, especially §5, “Integrity,” 108–118; “Persons, Character and Morality,” in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1–19; Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), especially chs. 5–6 and 10.

  2. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” 12–14; “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” §5. The discussion concerns the importance and authority of projects, not a claim that Williams approves every deeply held commitment.

  3. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), §§8.3–8.5, 136–140, and §11.5, 197–198. See also Chapter 2 of this book, “Commitment Under Reflection.” The paragraphs on the full cost of a life-defining project develop this chapter’s argument from the requirement of adequate representation.

  4. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” 17–19. His discussion responds to Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 227. The present chapter’s injured-stranger and fabricated-evidence examples extend the question of justification; they are not cases in which Williams is alleged to approve the conduct.

  5. Hare, Moral Thinking, chs. 2–3 and §§8.3–8.5; “Moral Conflicts,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 1 (1980), 171–193, especially 178–187. The Tanner Lecture was delivered in 1978. See Chapter 2 of this book for the fuller account of the relation between intuitive and critical thinking.

  6. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 107–110. For his direct examination of Hare, see “The Structure of Hare’s Theory,” in Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking, ed. Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), and Hare’s “Comments,” §14, in the same volume. Williams’s essay is reprinted in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, ed. A. W. Moore (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 76–85. The present reply distinguishes the object of a commitment, its justification, and the effects of reflecting on that justification; it is not offered as a survey of every objection in the 1988 exchange.

  7. Hare, “Utilitarianism and Moral Education: Comment on Sanford Levy’s Paper,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 11 (1992): 197–205, especially 201–204. The conflicting-promises example and the contrast between erosion and moral development occur at 203–204. The applications developed in the surrounding paragraphs are this chapter’s argument.

  8. Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in Moral Luck, 101–113, especially the discussion of deliberation and imagination at 103–105 and the challenge to external-reason statements at 106–111. The essay first appeared in Rational Action: Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, ed. Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 17–28. Compare “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” in Making Sense of Humanity and Other Philosophical Papers 1982–1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 35–45. The chapter uses the thesis as a claim about reasons, not merely about psychological persuasion.

  9. Hare, Moral Thinking, chs. 5–7 and ch. 10. The connection between sincere prescription and the agent’s existing practical commitments is the present chapter’s Harean response to the internal-reasons challenge, not a quotation or a newly identified direct exchange between Hare and Williams.

  10. Hare, Moral Thinking, ch. 10, especially §10.1, 170–171, and the dilemma at 179–182. The distinction is between a purported fully critical counterutilitarian fanatic and the extraordinary-preference case whose verdict is itself utilitarian. The conditional character of Hare’s exclusion is preserved. Chapters 7 and 8 of this book examine the underlying argument rather than treating willingness to suffer under one reversal as sufficient.

  11. Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” 18–19; see also 13–14 on the conflict between ground projects and impartial demands. The subsequent distinction between misrepresenting an agent’s loss and granting identity an exemption is this chapter’s argument. It does not attribute to Williams a blanket rejection of moral change.

  12. Victor Hugo, Les Misérables (1862), Part I, Book IV, especially chs. 1–3; Part II, Book III, especially chs. 2 and 8–10. The literary references here and below use part, book, and chapter rather than translation-dependent page numbers. The three figures illustrate relations between identity and accountability; they are not presented as an empirical classification of human or nonbiological minds.

  13. Hugo, Les Misérables, Part V, Book III, ch. 11, and Book IV, “Javert déraillé,” translated as “Javert Derailed” in Isabel F. Hapgood’s translation. Javert’s release of Valjean precedes his final crisis. The interpretation of his inability to integrate that departure corrects a reading in which he merely refuses to change his conduct.

  14. Hugo, Les Misérables, Part I, Book VII, especially ch. 3, “Une tempête sous un crâne” (“A Tempest in a Skull”), and ch. 11. Valjean’s consideration of the people dependent on his work is part of the episode. The argument here concerns the relation between his social role and his moral purpose; it does not treat the novel as a proof of a particular aggregation rule.